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Terence Arnold*

State-Induced Error of Law,
Criminal Liability and Dunn v.
The Queen: A Recent

Non-Development in Criminal
Law.

I. Introduction
Like other contributors to this Nova Scotia issue of the Law Journal
I was asked to comment upon any interesting developments,
whether in cases or legislation, that had occurred in a particular area
of law, in my case criminal law, since the time of the last
"round-up". 1 When I began I intended to do as I had been asked;
and there were, indeed, a number of matters which I felt to be
worthy of comment. 2 1 was waylaid, however. I came across a case
in which the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
took a position which so strongly offended my "sense of injustice"
that I abandoned my former efforts and decided to focus on the
issues which the Court's position raises. The decision to which I
refer is Dunn v. The Queen; 3 the position which I will analyze
concerns mistake of law. 4
*Terence Arnold, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University
I. For the earlier discussion of criminal law developments in the province see
Ortego and Goode, Recent Developments in CriminalLaw in Nova Scotia (1976), 2
Dal. L.J. 744.
2. See, for example, R. v. Stevens (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 96 (N.S.S.C., A.D.) "found committing" arrest power, R. v. Saunders (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 243; 38
C.R.N.S. 33 (N.S.S.C., A.D.) - obstruction of a constable in the execution of his
duty; R. v. Boutilier and Melnick (1976), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 555 (N.S.S.C., T.D.) interception of private communications; R. v. Bradshaw (unreported, judgement
delivered June 1, 1977; N.S. (Prov. Mag. Ct.)- "half-way house" offence; R. v.
Dalton (1977), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 555 (N.S.S.C., A.D.) - the granting of
discharges; R. v. Longeuay (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 438 (N.S.S.C., A.D.) sentencing in trafficking cases. Also, a variety of interesting problems are raised by
the use of road-side screening devices in Nova Scotia.
3. (1977), 21 N.S.R. (2d) 334.
4. A number of cases involving issues of mistake or ignorance of law have arisen
in Nova Scotia in recent years - see the cases cited in Ortego and Goode, supra,
note 1 at 776 n. 151 andR. v. MacLean (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84; 27 C.R.N.S.
31 (N.S. Cty. Ct.), which is discussed, id. at 776-90 and in Note, CriminalLawDefences -Mistake of Law -Bona Fide DiligentEffort to Ascertain and Comply
withLaw (1975), 10 U.B.C. L. Rev. 320. See also two related cases,R. v. McPhee
(1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 229 (N.S. Prov. Mag Ct.);R. v. ClarkAssoc. Ltd. (1976),
32 C.C.C. (2d) 351 (N.S. Cty. Ct.)
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Before I discuss the case, however, I should note that initially I
felt some diffidence about the fairness of my analyzing the Court's
comments on the mistake of law issue argued in the case; for in the
result the Court decided that the facts were not such as actually to
raise the issue. The Court's comments, therefore, were based upon
a hypothetical state of facts. I ultimately overcame this diffidence,
however, and felt that I was justified in so doing, for the following
reasons. First, counsel on the appeal strongly urged the mistake of
law argument and the Court received supplementary memoranda on
the matter. Presumably, then, the Court's comments were made
after the benefit of some thought. Second, the Court's view accords
with that which has traditionally been taken in the common law and
is one for which there is considerable authority, both in Canada and
elsewhere.
II. The Decision in the Dunn Case
Dunn was charged with an offence against s. 235(2) of the Criminal
Code5 in that he refused without reasonable excuse to comply with a
lawful demand for a breath sample. He was convicted before a
Judge of the Nova Scotia Provincial Magistrates Court. He then
appealed by way of stated case to the Appeal Division of the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court. His appeal failed.
One of the arguments which Dunn's counsel raised on appeal, an
argument not raised before the trial court, was that Dunn had a
reasonable excuse for refusing to accede to the breathalyzer demand
as, contrary to s. 2(c) (ii) of the CanadianBill ofRights, 6 he was not
afforded an opportunity to consult his lawyer in private. The
"facts" urged in support of this argument were as follows. A police
officer made a demand upon Dunn for a sample of his breath. Dunn
accompanied the officer to a police station where the test was to be
carried out. Once there he requested an opportunity to telephone a
lawyer before he responded to the demand. The police acceded to
this request. Dunn contacted a lawyer, who, as the argument went,
put a number of questions to him and as a result of Dunn's answers
concluded that Dunn was not being accorded the degree of privacy
necessary for the consultation. He therefore advised Dunn to refuse
the demand, which advice Dunn accepted. Thus the charge of
5. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
6. R.S.C. 1970, App. III.
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refusal against him. At no point did Dunn ask the police for greater
privacy.
At the time the lawyer was alleged to have given this advice to
Dunn the law as to the degree of privacy necessary to give effect to
the right to counsel was set out in a number of decisions of
provincial courts of appeal including a decision of the Appeal
Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, R. v. Doherty. 7 The
effect of these decisions was to establish that the right to retain and
instruct counsel carried with it the right to do so in private. This
right to privacy was not dependent upon a request for privacy but
was a natural component of the right to counsel; just as the right to
counsel could be waived, however, so could the right to privacy.
The degree of privacy appropriate to any situation was to depend
upon circumstances such as the physical structure of the police
station, the availability of telephones and the number of personnel
on duty. Unfortunately, prior to Dunn's case coming on for trial the
Supreme Court of Canada gave its decision in Jumaga v. The
Queen.8 In that case the Court held that the right to privacy will be
treated as being waived if no request for privacy is made. Hence
under the case-law as it stood at the time of his refusal Dunn
arguably had a "reasonable excuse" for refusing the demand; under
the case-law as it stood at the date of trial he had no such
"reasonable excuse". Counsel for Dunn suggested that his client
should be judged in accordance with the law as it stood when he
acted.
Upon a perusal of the transcript of evidence from the trial 9 the
Appeal Division held that, while the matter of privacy had clearly
been raised by the lawyer with Dunn, the real reason for the
lawyer's advice to Dunn that he should refuse the test was that the
lawyer felt that the demand was unlawful because the officer who
made it did not have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that
7. (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 494; 25 C.R.N.S. 289. The other relevant court of
appeal decisions are R. v. Penner (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 468; 22 C.R.N.S. 35
(Man. C.A.); R. v. Balkan (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 482; 25 C.R.N.S. 109 (Alta.
S.C., A.D.); R. v. Makshnchuk (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 208; [1974]2 W.W.R. 668
(Man. C.A.);R. v. Walkington (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 253; [197412 W.W.R. 454
(Man. C.A.); R. v. Irwin (1974), 18 C.R.N.S. (2d) 563; 28 C.R.N.S. 23 (Man.

C.A.).
8. (]976), 29 C.C.C. (2d) 269; 34 C.R.N.S. 172.
9. The Appeal Division is permitted under R. 66.08 of the Nova Scotia Rules of
Civil Procedure to include the transcript of evidence as part of the record in a stated
case.

562 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Dunn was committing an offence against either section 234 or
section 236 of the Code.'-0 The facts, therefore, did not support
counsel's argument. However, the Court went on to say that even if
the facts had supported counsel's argument Dunn would have had
no defence. Mr. Justice Macdonald, delivering a judgement
concurred in by MacKeigan C.J.N.S. and Coffin J.A., said:
The law in relation to privacy in this type of case as enunciated by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Jumaga states the law not only
as of the date of such judgment but defines what it has always
been. Consequently, even if the appellant had been advised by
[his lawyer] to refuse to provide a sample of his breath on the
ground that he was not afforded the Doherty kind of privacy in
making the telephone call, such would have been a mistake of
law on the part of [the lawyer] and would not afford a defence to
the charge at trial after the judgment in Jumaga was
pronounced."'
The learned judge referred to s. 19 of the Criminal Code12 andR. v.
Campbell andMlynarchuk13 as providing authority for this.
In the remainder of this comment I wish to examine two issues
arising from this statement. The first concerns the declaratory
theory of law and the second concerns "state-induced"1 4 mistakes
of law.
III. Judicialdecision-makingand the declaratorytheory
In order to find that Dunn's lawyer, and therefore Dunn, had made a
mistake of law the Appeal Division had somehow to show that the
authorities upon which the lawyer relied did not, at the time he
relied'upon them, accurately state the law. In effect, then, the Court
10. Dunn v. The Queen, supra, note 3 at 340-1.
11. Id. at 341. For the purposes of the following discussion I will treat the
hypothetical state of facts as the real one.
12. S. 19 of the Code provides as follows:
Ignorance of the law by a person who commits an offence is not an excuse for
committing that offence.
The section does not expressly refer to mistake of law and clear distinctions can be
drawn between mistake and ignorance - see, for example, the discussion in
Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the CriminalLaw (1908), 22 Harv. L. Rev. 73 at
76 and O'Connor, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases (1976), 39 M.L.R.
644 at 652-3. However, the courts do not generally utilize these potential
distinctions and treat the terms as synonomous. For the purpose of referring to the
doctrine set out in s. 191 will do likewise.
13. (1972), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 26; 21 C.R.N.S. 273 (Alta. D.C.).
14. 1 adapted this term from Silving and Ryu, ErrorJuris: A Comparative Study
(1957), 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421 at 436.

Criminal Law 563

had to give retrospective application to Jumaga. This the Court was
able to do by relying upon one of the important theoretical traditions
of the common law, namely the declaratory theory of judicial
decision-making. While I do not intend to undertake an extensive
examination of the theory I do wish to put it in its original context so
as to provide an adequate background for a consideration of its use
by the Court in the Dunn case.
It is convenient to take as an illustration of the declaratory theory
in its original form, and the view of law from which it sprang,
Blackstone's analysis in Commentarieson the Laws of England; for
although most elements of Blackstone's perspective can be found in
the works of earlier writers such as Hale and Coke it was Blackstone
who first attempted to develop a coherent theory of the common law
and the judge's role in respect to that law.
Stated briefly, 15 it was Blackstone's view that the common law
was made up of the customs both of the English people as a whole
and of particular classes and groups of Englishmen, these customs
having existed through the ages. Such customs in the main reflected
the precepts of natural law. The common law was, as a general rule,
certain and capable of being understood by "every person of
discretion". It was made known principally through the efforts of
those "depositories of the law", those "living oracles", the judges.
Judges, Blackstone argued, did not make law, they simply declared
it; their decisions were not "law", nor were they the sources of
law - rather they were evidence of what the law was. Judges were
bound to follow prior decisions, however, unless they were
"contrary to reason" or to "divine law". Thus where a judge did
reject a prior decision he was not creating new law but simply
"vindicating the old one from misrepresentation". I should
emphasize that Blackstone did not include statute law within this
analysis. Such law he dealt with separately. 16
Blackstone's views have been subject to extensive criticism and,
often, ridicule. 17 Lifted from their historical, social and cultural
15. This account is taken in the main from I Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England, ed. W. D. Lewis (Philadelphia: Rees Welsh & Coy., 1898) at
*67-*71. One commentator has said of Blackstone's views that they are "for the
most part incomprehensible to the twentieth-century mind." Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977) at 5 fn. 4. I now have
considerable sympathy with this view.
16. Commentaries, supra, note 15 at *85- *91.
17. Bentham and Austin, for example, bitterly attacked Blackstone's views- see,
as an illustration, Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries ed. C. W. Everett
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background they do seem to be vulnerable. However; I wish here
simply to make a number of comments on two central elements of
Blackstone's theory which are of significance for our analysis. 18
The first is the notion that answers to all legal problems can be
derived from a body of pre-existing law. The second is the
consequential idea that judges simply declare the law.
First, if the law is to be seen as pre-existing (i.e. antedating
particular, apparently creative, decisions) it must have some source
or fountainhead. Blackstone identified the source as custom.
Historically, Blackstone's point may have some validity. The nature
of early legal proceedings was such that custom must inevitably
have played an important part in judicial decision-making. 19 Judges
20
in more recent times have clearly been influenced by usage.
However, to acknowledge the historical significance of custom in
the development of the common law and to recognize that even
today there are points of contact between custom and law
formulation is not to accept that the common law can now, or could
even in the time of Blackstone, be accurately described simply as
popular or particular customs. 2 1 It is not clear, assuming that the
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928). The notion that judges simply declare the law has
been subject to particular attack and this attack was generally thought to have been
effective - see, for example, Goodhart, Case Law -A Short Replication (1934),
50 L.Q.R. 196 at 197:
Austin and Gray have done their work too well; they have killed this childish but
highly convenient fiction insofar as modem law is concerned.
Apparently their work is not yet complete for stubborn adherents remain. In
fairness I should perhaps point out that Blackstone and the declaratory theory have
their champions - see, for example, 12 Holdsworth, A History of English Law
(London: Methuen & Co., 1938) at 717-737 and, by the same author, Case Law
(1934), 50 L.Q.R. 180 at 184-5.
18. Several of these comments are based principally upon the brief analyses of
Blackstone's views given in Dias, Jurisprudence(4th ed. London: Butterworths,
1976) at 204-5 and Cross, Precedent in English Law (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1968) at 23-9.
19. Thus writes Greer, Custom in English Law (1893), 9 L.Q.R. 153 at 157-8:
. . . the proposition [that custom was the source of the common law] ...
affords the only rational explanation of the genesis and early development of the
Common Law, and is abundantly supported by the evidence of the old writs and
the records of the Year Books.
20. Lord Mansfield is perhaps the best known example of a judge who took great
care to give legal recognition to custom. He went so far as to consult on a regular
basis a jury of businessmen to learn from them the customs and usages of the
commercial world - see, for example 12 Holdsworth, supra, note 17 at 526-8.
21. For a critical analysis of the notion that the common law is simply custom see
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Court advanced the declaratory theory as a description of reality,
what the Appeal Division perceives to be the source of the
pre-existing law "declared" by the Supreme Court inJumaga.
Second, the notion that judges simply apply pre-existing law
contains characteristics that are useful both from a political and
from a practical perspective. For example, from a political
perspective it is much easier for the judiciary to justify withstanding
the power or wishes of the executive by appealing to some law that
is above both than it is by openly asserting its own view against that
of the executive. "Higher law" provides a tool whereby the courts
can challenge and restrain the executive. 2 2 Furthermore, acceptance
of the theory permits one to hold literally to the doctrine of the
separation of powers and so deny that the courts ever encroach upon
the legislative function. From a practical perspective the theory can
be used to deny, at least in large measure, the apparently
retrospective nature of some judicial activity. Moreover, it permits
judges to retain a considerable degree of flexibility within an
apparently rigid system of precedent. Again, it provides a shield for
the judiciary against resentment caused by unpopular decisions; for
judges are seen simply as the mouthpieces, not the creators, of the
law. Perhaps it is these factors of convenience that account for the
resilience of the declaratory theory.
Third, the idea that judges simply declare pre-existing law may
be accurate to describe the routine work of the courts, particularly
those lower in the hierarchy. Most cases in the lower courts present
factual, not legal, disputes. However, the theory does not accurately
portray, 2 3 or, at least, offer a useful picture of, some of the work of
Dickinson, The Law Behind Lawv (1929), 29 Col. L. Rev. 113, 285 at 125-41. For
further enlightment on the whole matter see Simpson, The Common Law and Legal
Theory in A. W. B. Simpson, ed., Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence (Second
Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) at 77. Simpson gives "custom" a different
meaning and concludes (at 94) that:
...the common law system is properly located as a customary system of law in
this sense, that it consists of a body of practices observed and ideas perceived by
a caste of lawyers, these ideas being used by them as providing guidance in
what is conceived to be the rational determination of disputes litigated before
them, and in other contexts.
22. Dickinson, supra, note 21 at 117-8.
23. One commentator argues that it cannot be proved that judges do make law and
hence the declaratory theory cannot be effectively disproved - see Snyder,
Retrospective Operationof OverrulingDecisions (1940-41), 35 111. L. Rev. 121 at
125-7. However, at the very least one might argue that the theory is not a
particularly useful analysis to adopt.
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the courts, especially of the higher courts. There are many judicial
decisions which can only be described as creative, even though
judges may attempt in the content and structure of their judgements
to disguise this. 24 Acceptance of this point does not force one to
equate judicial law creation with legislative law creation, however,
or to see judicial creativity as essentially arbitrary. Pre-existing law
clearly does provide an important backdrop for judicial decisionmaking. As Jerome Hall writes:
Law does pre-exist, but not in the degree of specificity required
for all subsequent adjudications. It pre-exists "sufficiently" to
bar arbitrariness and to limit the scope of judicial legislation,
2 5 but
judicial decision plays an essential role in its development.
Fourth, it seems to me that those who talk in terms of the
declaratory theory today are not usually espousing the Blackstonian
theory of the common law but are advocating a philosophy of
judicial decision-making. They are not urging the declaratory theory
as a literal description of judicial conduct which has significant
practical consequences for the application of particular principles or
doctrines of law, such as the rule concerning mistake of law, but
rather are identifying a general approach towards the judicial
function and its relationship to the legislative function. An
illustration of this is to be found in the speech of Viscount Dilhorne
in Broome v. Cassell & Co. 2 6 There the learned Law Lord
commented on statements of Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard2 7
which, in his view, were clearly inconsistent with an earlier
decision of the House of Lords, Ley v. Hamilton. 28 In discussing
what he saw as Lord Devlin's obvious departure from precedent
Viscount Dilhorne said:
As I understand the judicial functions of this House, although
they involve applying well established principles to new
situations, they do not involve adjusting the common law to what
are thought to be the social norms of the time. They do not include
bowing to the winds of change. We have to declare what the law
24. Obvious examples of judicial decisions which should be described as creative
(although "based" on earlier decisions) are Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C.
562; Woolmington v. DirectorofPublic Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462 and Hedley
Bryne & Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd., [1964] A.C. 465.
25. Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed. Indianapolis:
Bobbs Merrill, 1960) at 390.
26. [1972]A.C. 1027 at 1100-11.
27. [1964] A.C. 1129 at 1221-33.
28. (1935), 153 L.T. 384.
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is, not what we think it should be. 29
In contexts such as this the language of the declaratory theory is
used to deny the propriety of the courts' departing from positions
clearly adopted in earlier cases and to suggest that where new
problems do arise the courts should fashion solutions, not ab initio
but in terms of the pre-existing law by a process of reasoning by
analogy. Radical and far-reaching decisions must come from the
legislature. While some may find the declaratory theory taken in
this sense to be unpalatable most would concede that it does
represent a defensible position.. One cannot, in my view, say as
much for the theory if it is given a literal meaning.
Finally, it may be that the declaratory theory should not be taken
as a literal description of the judicial process but rather as an
appropriate working assumption concerning that process. The
making of such an assumption would presumably be justified in
terms of necessity or public policy. The theory, then, is what is
delicately described as a "legal fiction". The difficulty with this, of
course, is that it is not clear why it is necessary, apart from
considerations of convenience such as those outlined above, to
adopt the theory as a working assumption.
What, then, does the declaratory theory have to do with the
doctrine that mistake of law cannot afford a defence to a criminal
charge? If one takes the theory as simply outlining a general
approach to judicial decision-making it surely has nothing to do
with the doctrine - it is a guiding principle for judicial action and
no more. If, however, one accepts the declaratory theory as an
accurate, literal description of the judicial process then one may see
some valid connection between the theory and the doctrine. The
connection will be at its most compelling if one accepts the other
important elements of Blackstone's views. For example, James C.
Carter writes:
• . . if law be.

.

. the mere jural form of the habits, usages and

thoughts of a people, the maxim that all are presumed to know it
does not express a false assumption but a manifest truth. In the
great game of society as in the little one of ball, all the players are
justly presumed to be familiar with the usages, that is, with the
rules. 3 0
29. Supra, note 26 at 1107.
30. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law (1890), 24 Am. L. Rev. 752 at
761.
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If it were true that the law was based upon the customs of the people
in some direct fashion there might be some justification for
attaching people with the knowledge of those customs. However, it
seems absurd to apply this sort of analysis to Canada which, like
many other modem states, has suffered a "law explosion". The
scope of law has broadened considerably and more and more law is
set out in statutes. 3 1 The conditions giving rise to this enormous
expansion of law, together with the fact that such expansion has
occurred, point to a decreasing connection between law and custom
and render Carter's game analogy quite inapt. Finally, if one
accepts the declaratory theory as a legal fiction, a working
assumption of the law, one can readily enough apply it in the
context of the mistake of law doctrine. However, that so important
and difficult an issue as the appropriate relationship between
individual culpability and state interest in the area of mistake of law
should be resolved in so artificial a fashion is to me indefensible. It
is simply not clear whether the Appeal Division in Dunn adopted the
declaratory theory as a literal description of the judicial process or
simply as a working assumption in respect to that process.
Whichever the Court intended, however, is perhaps irrelevant as
both positions are quite inappropriate.
In summary, then, the declaratory theory of judicial decisionmaking constituted one element of a view of the common law given
prominence by Blackstone, a man of conservative outlook writing
in a time of great social change. Considering the fact that times have
changed - the context from which Blackstone's view arose no
longer exists, the prespective has suffered extensive and effective
criticism, the law has moved from a common law base to a statutory
base and so on - it is surprising that the Appeal Division was
prepared to apply the theory as though its validity was beyond
dispute.
IV. State-inducederrorof law
The principle espoused in s. 19 of the Code - that ignorance of the
law is no defence to a criminal charge - is, as is so often the case,
31. Studies prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada suggest that there
are, besides those offences set out in the Criminal Code, some 20,000 regulatory
offences at the Federal level and a similar number in most of the provinces - see
Fitzgerald and Elton, The Size of the Problem in L.R.C.C., Studies on Strict
Liability (Ottawa, 1974) 42 at 56.
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subject to exceptions. For example, it is frequently said that a
mistake of law which negatives a specific intent will form the basis
of a valid defence or, more accurately, denial of an essential
element of the Crown's case. 32 However, in Canada, there is no
generally recognized exception based on the notion that the mistake
made was brought about by some authority or official held out or
recognized by the state as having particular expertise in the matter.
Errors arguably included within this category are those resulting
from reliance or judicial decisions which are subsequently reversed
or overruled, from reliance upon the advice of government officials
or from reliance upon the advice of lawyers. 3 3 Dunn, of course,
might bring himself under this heading in two ways. First, he relied
upon the advice of his lawyer and second, through his lawyer, he
relied upon valid judicial decisions which were somewhat modified
by the later decision of a higher court. I propose to consider whether
the law ought to recognize "exceptions" to the mistake of law
34
doctrine in either of these two situations.
Before I commence this discussion, however, I should identify
32. See, for example, Dunn v. The Queen, supra, note 3 at 344. 1 am suspicious of
the use of the term "specific intent" in this context, particularly in light of its
analysis by the Supreme Court of Canada inR. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871; 128
C.C.C. 289. The term confuses rather than elucidates. I prefer-the analysis of
Williams, The Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed. London: Stevens and
Sons, 1961) at 304-45 and Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (3rd ed. London:
Butterworths, 1973) at 56-8, who suggest that mistake of law will afford a defence
where
(i) a legal concept (probably one of civil law) is embodied in the definition of the
offence and a mistake is made with respect to that legal concept; or
(ii) the mistake gives rise to a "colour of right" claim.
33. Lawyers are included within this category as they are "authorized" by the
state to give legal advice. There are, of course, other errors which may come under
the heading of state induced error, for example, those resulting from poorly drafted
or inadequately publicized legislation - see Ryu and Silving, supra, note 14 at
436.
34. The traditional position concerning mistakes of law brought about by
erroneous advice from governmental officials is of course that they afford no
defence; but for a decision where such reliance was accepted as indicating that the
defendants were without mens rea see R. v. Seemar Mines Ltd. (1974), 23 C.C.C.
(2d) 54. For a recent discussion of this position see Ashworth, Excusable Mistake
of Law, [1974] Crim. L. Rev. 652 at 657-61. Some American courts have given
effect to such reliance - see for example, the authorities discussed in Hall and
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea (1941), 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 641 at 675-83.
See also the discussion in Comment, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal
Cases (1969), 78 Yale L.J. 1046. One way to avoid this position is to classify such
mistakes as mistakes of fact - see, for example, R. v. McPhee, supra, note 4.
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some of the assumptions about the criminal law which underlie the
comments which follow. 3 5 First, the criminal law has no common
fundamental characteristic. Rather, crime is diverse. Some crimes
offend moral values, others do not - they are simply regulatory or
administrative in nature. Those forms of criminal behavior which do
offend moral norms may offend norms accepted by a majority of the
population or may offend norms accepted simply by segments of the
population -' "moral entrepreneurs" or other special interest
groups who have the power to enshrine their moral values in the
law. 3 6 Doctrines or principles which do not reflect, or do not reflect
adequately, the diversity of criminal law are likely at some point to
cause injustice. Second, while there is often disagreement as to
what the criminal law should do there is, I feel some uniformity of
opinion amongst people as to what it should not do. The legal
solutions to particular cases may significantly offend the collective
sense of injustice. For example, people tend to react to harm that is
deliberately or recklessly caused quite differently from the way in
which they react to harm that is accidentally caused. If the criminal
law were to draw no distinction between harms accidentally caused
and those intentionally caused it would, I think, appear unfair to
35. I state these assumptions in very general terms, cognizant of the fact that in
doing so I have ignored serious difficulties with them. I also state them without
acknowledgement of sources as they are, I believe, common-place. Indeed, to a
considerable extent it is their general acceptability that led me to adopt them as a
framework.
36. This position does not require a commitment to either side in the continuing
debate between the consensus and conflict theorists of social organization (see, for
example, Chambliss, Functionaland Conflict Theories of Crime in Chambliss and
Mankoff, eds., Whose Law? What Order? (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976)
for a useful summary of the debate). Rather it accepts elements of both views.
Surely there would be little disagreement that killing and coerced sexual intercourse
should be the subjects of criminal prohibitions, although there might be
disagreement as to the precise scope and structure of the respective prohibitions.
On other matters, however, the criminal law does seem to reflect simply the
concerns of the powerful. Perhaps the hate propaganda provisions of the Code (ss.
281.1-281.3) are an example. It may be unrealistic to suggest that the law could
ever take account of this type of factor; for to do so would be to acknowledge an
inherent defect in itself. However, it is simply suggested that the moral values
protected in the criminal law vary in nature and force and that the law ought in
some contexts to respond to this. The other alternative, of course, is to remove
those provisions from the criminal law which enforce a moral value that is not
generally held. This would leave within the ambit of the criminal law some
(perhaps all) conduct which offended generally accepted, fundamental moral
values and conduct which, although not immoral, was clearly disruptive of the
general requirements of orderliness within a complex society. See Wexler, The
Intersection ofLaw andMorals (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 351.
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most people, at least in the context of particular cases. As the
criminal law ultimately depends for its effectiveness upon public
acceptance (or, at least, tolerance) it should not too frequently
compel solutions which may undermine that acceptance. The
criminal law should only adopt positions which the public will
perceive as unfair where such action is clearly demonstrated to be
necessary. Third, the notion of individual culpability is a crucial
philosophical underpinning of the criminal law and its sanctioning
process. This ought to be reflected in the substantive principles of
the criminal law. As a basic premise, penal liability should attach
only to a person who, on what must be a crude assessment, has
consciously or recklessly violated the law or some fundamental
moral value protected by the law; for it is a violation of this sort
which is seen as providing the justification for the imposition of a
criminal sanction.3 7 However, the state of mind of the accused,
viewed subjectively, is not the only legitimate consideration upon
which decisions as to penal liability can be made - public policy or
the social interest also has a valid role. Hence it is proper for the
criminal law to adopt a position which gives precedence to public
policy over the subjective attitude of an accused, to formulate a rule
which is intended to achieve a desirable social end or enforce a
social judgement albeit at the expense of an accused person's
subjective mental state. Thus, for example, the law may be
formulated so as to deny the availability of the defence of duress to a
charge of murder. Again, however, before this type of action is
taken those who formulate the law must have some clearly defined
and readily attainable objective in mind. It is within this framework
that the following comments are made.
1. Reliance upon validjudicialdecisions
The Court in Dunn referred to and adopted the decision of Kerans
37. This notion of individual responsibility is an unreaslistically egalitarian one.
The criminal law takes very limited account of the factors which relate to an
individual's ability to make law-abiding choices. Defences such as insanity are
available but, at the point of imposing liability, no consideration is given to the fact
that the chief targets of the criminal justice system - the young, the poor, the
uneducated and the unskilled - do not have the range of choices available to those
from other parts of the social structure. Arguably, if the criminal law is prepared to
excuse some of those who act under mental handicaps it ought also to give some
recognition to social handicaps. For a preliminary discussion of this see Kerans,
Distributiveand Retributive Justice in Canada (1977), 4 Dal. L.J. 76.
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D.C.J. in R. v. Campbell and Mlynarchuk. 38 In that case a young
woman was charged with giving an immoral performance contrary
to s. 163(2) of the Code. (She had apparently performed a
somewhat vigorous go-go dance during which she had removed her
clothing, such as it was.) She gave this performance only after
learning from a friend that a trial judge of the Supreme Court of
Alberta had acquitted a woman of a similar charge on similar facts
(R. v. Johnson (No. 1)39). Unfortunately after her performance but
before her trial the Appellate Division reversed the trial judge in
Johnson, and convicted the woman. 40 What then was the position of
Campbell? Kerans D.C.J. held that he was bound by the decision of
the Appellate Division in Johnson and that Campbell in relying
upon the decision of the trial judge in that case had made an error of
law which would afford her no defence. 4 1 He therefore found
Campbell guilty but, in light of the circumstances, entered an
absolute discharge instead of a conviction.
As well as dealing with the problem of errors brought about by
reliance upon valid judicial decisions the judgement of Kerans
D.C.J. outlines the traditional justifications for the general mistake
of law doctrine. 42 These are such as to merit, I think, some slight
digression. In talking of the doctrine the learned judge said:
There will also be cases, not so complicated as this, where honest
and reasonable mistakes as to the state of the law will be the
explanation of the conduct of an accused. In such a circumstance,
one cannot help but have sympathy for the accused. But this
situation, traditionally, is not a defence. It is not a defence, I
think, because the first requirement of any system of justice, is
38. Supra, note 13.
39. [1972] 3 W.W.R. 226; 6 C.C.C. (2d) 462.
40. R. v. Johnson (No. 1), [1972] 5 W.W.R. 638; 8 C.C.C. (2d) 1. The Supreme
Court of Canada reversed this decision and acquitted Johnson - see Johnson v.
The Queen (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 402; 23 C.R.N.S. 273. At the time he made his
decision in Campbell and Mlynarchuk Kerans D.C.J. knew that Johnson was
before the Supreme Court but decided not to await the Court's decision.
41. The learned judge seems to have thought that Campbell made two mistakes of
law. The first was that she thought her conduct did not contravene the law, the
second was that she misunderstood the effect of a low level judicial decision in
assuming that it correctly stated the law. He also rejected the possibility that
Campbell could claim protection under s. 15 of the Code on the basis that she acted
in obedience with defacto authority - see R. v. Campbell andMlynarchuk, supra,
note 13 at 34-35.
42. For discussions of the historical background of the doctrine see Keedy, supra,
note 12 at 77-81; Hall and Seligman, supra, note 34 at 643-6; O'Connor, supra,
note 12 at 644-7; Ryu and Silving, supra, note 14 at 423-430.
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that it works efficiently and effectively. If the state of
understanding of the law of an accused person is ever to be
relevant in criminal proceedings, we would have an absurd
proceeding. The issue in a criminal trial would then not be what
the accused did, but whether or not the accused had a sufficiently
sophisticated understanding of the law to appreciate that what he
be a premium,
did offended against the law. There would
43
therefore, placed upon ignorance of the law.
Thus, in the matter of mistake of law we abandon the requirement of
individual culpability which is generally assumed to underlie the
criminal law; and this we do essentially for reasons of "efficiency"
and "effectiveness". Presumably in using these two terms Kerans
D.C.J. was making short-hand reference to the two arguments
commonly suggested in support of the mistake of law doctrine.
"Efficiency", it is often argued, demands the rule because to
permit a defendant to throw into dispute his knowledge of the law
would be to place insuperable difficulties in the path of the
prosecution.44 This, then, is a justification of "practical necessity".
"Effectiveness" requires the rule because by taking such a position
the legal system can enforce a social policy of requiring people to
know the law. 45 Here, then, is a justification of achieving a
desirable social end.
The learned judge's statement, like so many others made by
judges, rests upon unexamined assumptions about reality; and, to
my mind, such unthinking and uncritical acceptance of fundamental
assumptions is one of the worst defects of judicial decision-making
in many common law jurisdictions. 4 6 Does the Crown's position
43. Supra, note 13 at 31.
44. Austin is commonly cited as adhering to this view. He suggests that a person's
knowledge of the law is not an issue capable of resolution -see 1 Austin,Lectures
on Jurisprudenceed. Campbell (5th ed. London: John Murray, 1885) at 482-3.
45. The most frequently cited adherent to this view is Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
- see Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1909) at 48.
Brett, Mistake of Law as a CriminalDefence(1966), 5 Melb. Univ. L. Rev. 179 at
195 writes of this view:
This argument reflects Holmes's philosophy of 'social Darwinism' - the view
that in human societies the fittest only ought to survive and that the strong
majority are entitled to sacrifice the weak in order to achieve their own welfare.
It is not a philosophy which commends itself to modem thought, and it may be
doubted whether courts today would wish to invoke it.
46. This may be overly harsh on the learned judge as he is simply reiterating
received judicial wisdom. However judges, like other law formulators, tend to
make decisions based upon assumptions about the way things are or ought to be.
The difficulty is that these assumptions are rarely identified, much less examined in
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become impossible in those situations in which a defendant is now
entitled to raise a mistake of law defence? Are the criminal justice
systems of other jurisdictions which do permit wider mistake of law
defences thereby rendered inefficient and ineffective? For my part I
doubt the validity of the traditional assumptions. The law permits a
defendant to raise mistake of fact, even an unreasonable one, as a
defence. So far as I can tell this has not been responsible for
reducing the administration of justice to an absurdity. Some see a
dramatic difference between mistake of fact and mistake of law as
far as proof goes. 47 Others, however, do not. Thus Houlgate writes:
. . . if the courts harbor few doubts about proving or disproving
the honesty of a defendant who pleads ignorance of fact, then
there are no independent reasons to fear the stigma of dishonesty
when the plea is one of ignorance of law. If C fires at D at
point-blank range, then his defense that he did not know that D
was standing in front of him would be received with incredulity,
and so would a defense that he did not know murder to be a
crime. On the other hand, if C shoots D when hunting at dusk, his
defense that he did not intend to kill D might be believed; and, in
the same way, his belief that he is entitled by law to shoot a
would-be thief might be believed, whether it represents the true
legal position or not. 48
Furthermore, is it necessary to have so crude and harsh a rule as the
common law rule in order effectively to promote as social policy the
idea that people ought to make some effort to find out what the law
is? It might well be argued that a rule which punishes not only the
negligent but also the careful is, from a social policy perspective,
unnecessary and, worse, counter-productive: for rather than
rewarding, or at least protecting, the careful it punishes them - and
where is the incentive to know the law in that?
I, like the learned judge, may be criticized for having done little
more than speculate in the comments which I have just made.
Perhaps it is inevitable that speculation form the basis for the law's
position on mistake of law, at least for the moment. 49 If, however,
the light of empirical data that social scientists can provide. There are, however,
exceptions to this, most notably the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
InRe Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1; 87 S. Ct. 1428.
47. See, for example, Hall and Seligman, supra, note 34 at 651.
48. Houlgate, IgnorantiaJuris:A Pleafor Justice (1967-8), 78 Ethics 32 at 37-38.
The point was earlier made, in almost identical terms, in Williams, CriminalLaw:
The GeneralPart (2nd ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1961) at 291.
49. It may be that the assumptions about reality which underlie certain legal
doctrines or principles are simply incapable of empirical assessment. The
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speculation is to provide the foundation for this or any other legal
rule perhaps speculation that permits results that accord with some
fundamental sense of fairness should be recognized above
speculation that produces, at least occasionally, results that are
clearly harsh.
One other major justification for the mistake of law doctrine has
been advanced and it is, perhaps, hinted at by Kerans D.C.J. in the
50
above quoted statement. It is a justification urged by Jerome Hall.
He argues that "knowledge" in the context of law is quite different
from "knowledge" the context of facts. Where knowledge of
facts is concerned there is the possibility of certainty; where
knowledge of law is concerned there is not. By "knowledge" in the
context of law, Hall argues, we really mean "an interpretation of
law which coincides with the later relevant interpretation by the
relevant officials." 5 1 To permit a defendant to plead mistake of law
is to permit him to advance his interpretation over that of authorized
law-declaring officials. This contradicts the principle of legality.
Legal order, Hall writes:
.. . opposes objectivity to subjectivity, judicial process to
individual opinion, official to lay, and authoritative
to non52
authoritative declarations of what the law is.
Furthermore, he argues, the criminal law, if it is soundly based, will
reflect moral judgements of the community; individual moral
judgements should not be permitted to override those objective moral
judgements. 5 3 These arguments, although interesting, are flawed.
Houlgate, for example, suggests that in arguing that to permit a
person to raise mistake of law as a defence is to infringe the
principle of legality Hall confuses the notions of legality and
culpability. 54 In recognizing such a defence, he says, the law would
not be forced to a conclusion that an accused acted legally, but it
would rather be taking the view that the accused should not be held
culpable for his illegal act. Similarly, recognition of such a defence
does not mean that the defendant's actions are morally proper - it
assumptions underlying the mistake of law doctrine may, I suppose, fall into this
category.
50. Supra, note 25 at 382-7.
51. Id. at 409.
52. Id. at 383.
53. Hall suggests that where criminal laws do not reflect a current moral consensus
different rules concerning mistake should prevail - id. at 402-8.
54. Houlgate, supra, note 48 at 39-40.
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simply indicates that he will not be held morally responsible for his
immoral act. The distinction here, then, is that betweenjustification
and excuse. 5 5 Houlgate's criticisms of Hall's rationale are
convincing. If the law is inherently uncertain, at least at its edges,
such uncertainty should, fairness suggests, work to the disadvantage
of the law formulator, the state, rather than to the disadvantage of
the law consumer, the individual. Thus can some check be placed
upon the considerable advantage held by the state over the
56
individual in criminal matters.
Having advanced the justifications for the mistake of law doctrine
Kerans D.C.J. went on to consider whether there was, or should be,
any "exception" where the "mistake" came about as a result of
reliance upon a valid judicial decision. He said:
There is no question that there is something of an anomaly here.
Reliance on a specific order, of a specific Judge, granted at a
specific time and place, seems, at first sight, not to be ignorance
of the law, but knowledge of the law. If it turns out that that
Judge is mistaken, then of course, the reliance on that Judge's
judgement is mistaken. The irony is this; people in society are
expected to have a more profound knowledge of the law than are
the Judges. I am not the first person to have made that comment
the law, and while it is all very amusing, it is really to no
about 57
point.
Amusing or not, the position outlined above seems unrealistic,
unfair and, in the long term, unsatisfactory from the perspective of
public policy. Lawyers (and so also the public) routinely accept
statements as to the law from all levels of the judicial hierarchy and
act upon them. Judicial decisions which bring about changes in the
law cannot usually be predicted with assurance. The legal system
would surely become much more inefficient if lawyers were to treat
judicial decisions as though they were liable to be over-turned at any
moment. There is also a rather heavy-handed irony in the position.
The doctrine is justified in part as necessary to enforce a social
55. Id. at 40. Houlgate argues that mistakes of law which are "reasonable" should
be recognized by the law. I should note at this point that the remainder of this
comment is written upon the assumption that the basic mistake of law doctrine will
be retained.
56. A careful application of the rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed
may well meet the concern expressed in the text - see Hall, supra, note 25 at
388-9 where he deals with the point in a slightly different context. However, my
impression is that this rule of statutory interpretation is being increasingly
disregarded by Canadian courts.
57. R. v. Campbell and Mlynarchuk, supra, note 13 at 32.
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policy requiring knowledge of the law. Yet there it can be used to
penalize a person such as Dunn who does know the law as well as
anyone could. The law should be framed so as to encourage people
to find out what the current view of the law is and to act upon it and
should protect those who so act. Furthermore, can it not be argued
that the legal system, having in effect held out a particular position
as being the law, should not penalize someone who acts in reliance
upon that position? This "holding out" by the state should be
treated as creating a "criminal estoppel". 58
There seems to be general agreement on the part of those who
perceive a need to retain the mistake of law doctrine that those who
act in reliance upon valid judicial decisions should not be penalized
if those decisions are subsequently overruled. Many American
jurisdicitions take this view, 59 as did the drafters of the Model Penal
Code60 and the proposed Federal Penal Code. 61 Most commentators also accept the position. 62 It seems unlikely that chaos would
result were Canadain law to take the same view. If adherence to the
fictions that the law contains the answers to all possible legal
problems and that judges simply declare, but do not make, law is
seen as necessary, persons such as Dunn or Campbell who act in
reliance on current judicial decisions should be protected under an
exception to the mistake of law rule. 63 If, however, these fictions
were to be abandoned and the creative potential of judicial
decision-making were to be acknowledged no such exception would
be needed: for the courts would recognize what is manifestly true,
58. I took this term from Ashworth, supra, note 34 at 657.
59. A number of American states have adopted the Model Penal Code provision
(infra, note 60) - see Kadish and Paulsen, Criminal Law and its Processes (3rd
ed. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975) at 114. Others adopt the position through
judicial decisions - see, for example, the authorities cited in Hall and Seligman,
supra, note 34 at 669-673.
60. American Law Institute, Model PenalCode (1962), s. 2.04 (3) (b).
61. See the proposed Federal CriminalCode, s. 609(b) in National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report (1971). This draft has
undergone substantial amendment since it was first proposed but as far as I am
aware no change has been made to s. 609.
62. See, for example, Hall and Seligman, supra, note 34 at 669-73; Perkins,
Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law (1939), 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35 at 44;
Ashworth, supra, note 34 at 658.
63. The positions of Dunn and Campbell are not identical. Dunn clearly had a
much firmer basis for this reliance than did Campbell but I see no basis for the
law's differentiating between the two. Furthermore, both Dunn and Campbell
relied indirectly upon judicial decisions (Dunn through his lawyer, Campbell
through a friend) but this does not seem to me to raise any theoretical difficulty.
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namely that at the times when they acted both Campbell and Dunn
acted in conformity with the law. This, of course, is Jerome Hall's
64
approach.
If the law were to be changed, should it draw any distinction
between decisions from courts at different levels within the judicial
hierarchy? For example, should the law protect one who relies upon
a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada but not one who relies
upon a decision of the Nova Scotia County Court? I think not.65
Although a higher court speaks with more authority than a lower
court ultimately the policy considerations in respect to either are
identical. If the only relevant decisions are those from lower level
courts they represent, for the moment, the state's position on the
matter. A person who accepts such guidance as the state has offered
66
on the point can justly claim protection.
There is a further matter for consideration. If the law were to be
changed should it protect only the person who actually relies upon
an earlier decision or should it protect anyone whose conduct
conforms to an earlier case whether or not he knows of it? Both
Campbell and Dunn clearly knew of and relied upon the earlier
decisions; and several commentators take the view that such
reliance should be a precondition for protection. 67 Hall and
Seligman, however, state that the cases in the United States do not
impose this precondition and express the opinion that such a
precondition is not necessary. Rather, they assert, there should be a
conclusive presumption of reliance. 68 The writers give no indication
of the reasons for their view. I assume that such a conclusive
presumption would be based upon the notion that the state, having
held out a position, should be bound by it so long as it is in force
whether or not anyone knows of it or is specifically affected by it or,
64. Supra, note 25 at 391-2. This position follows logically from Hall's definition
of "knowledge" in the context of law.
65. The cases in the United States are apparently not uniform on the point - see,
for example, Hall and Seligman, supra, note 34 at 671-2.
66. Difficult problems may arise where there are conflicting decisions in several
provinces. For example, should a person in Nova Scotia accept a statement of law
given in a decision of the Nova Scotia County Court even though it conflicts with a
position clearly adopted by several courts of appeal in other provinces? The basic
rule should be, I think, that a person ought to accept the guidance given in his own
jurisdiction; however, the courts should be willing to depart from this rule if the
circumstances seem to demand it.
67. See, for example, Brett, supra, note 45 at 186; Ashworth, supra, note 34 at
658.
68. Supra, note 34 at 671. See also Perkins, supra, note 62 at 44 fn. 84.
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alternatively, upon the notion that " . . . reliance is hard to prove
effectively for it is a mental state and the defendant [should be]
given the benefit of any doubt as to his actual reliance".69
However, the effect of creating such a presumption is to protect the
person who has no regard for the legality of his conduct as well as
the person who is concerned with it and takes steps to clarify his
position. Both from the perspective of public policy (acknowledging and rewarding good citizenship) and from that of subjective
culpability (protecting only the person who honestly believes that
his actions are innocent) one might challenge this view. As Brett
points out:
The man who does not bother about the legality of his conduct is
poles apart from the man who makes an honest effort
to behave in
70
conformity to the law but is mistaken or misled.
Thus, assuming that the basic rule concerning mistake of law is to
be retained, I suggest that the law should be changed so as to protect
one who acts in reliance upon a valid judicial decision either on the
basis that he has made no mistake as to the law or, less
satisfactorily, upon the basis that his case constitutes an exception to
the mistake of law rule. A defendant should be permitted to raise
this argument in respect to a judicial decision from any level in the
judicial hierarchy (provided, of course, that at the time there was no
decision from a higher court within the jurisdiction dealing with the
matter) and would have to adduce evidence indicating that he had
acted in reliance on the decision. None of this should affect the
71
normal rules concerning the legal or persuasive burden of proof.
2. Reliance upon a lawyer's advice
The common law has long taken the position that reliance upon the
advice of a lawyer that particular conduct is not criminal is no
defence to a criminal charge should that advice turn out to be
erroneous. This position has been explicitly established in

69. Note, Retroactive Effect of Judicial Change of Existing Law in Criminal
Proceedings (1928), 28 Col. L. Rev. 963 at 966.
70. Brett, supra, note45 at 186.
71. It is quite frequently stated that if a defence such as that suggested in the text
were to be recognized the legal burden of proof in respect to that defence should
rest upon the accused. However, I do not see any justification for that.
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England, 72 in Canada, 73 in the United States 74 and in Australia. 75
From time to time judges have attempted to offer a defence in this type
of situation, however. A Canadian example is to be found
in the judgement of Tavender D.C.J. in R. v. Burkinshaw and
Zora.76 In that case the accused, directors of a company that had
been convicted of unlawfully trading in securities contrary to the
Alberta Securities Act, 77 were charged with "authorizing, permitting or acquiescing in" the company's offence. 78 At trial Tavender
D.C.J. acquitted the accused on the basis that the relevant section
required a general mental element and the accused lacked such
mental element. He said:
I am satisfied on the evidence that these two accused had no mens
rea. They and the company all acted on legal advice obtained
from a prominent firm of solicitors. They were told that their
actions were legal. I think that7on
9 this basis it cannot be suggested
that they had any guilty mind.
The approach of the learned trial judge is similar to that of the
Supreme Court of Delaware in the well-known case of Long v.
State.8 0 The defendant in that case was charged with bigamy,
having remarried on the basis of what proved to be erroneous legal
advice as to the effect of an out-of-state divorce. He attempted to
introduce evidence at his trial to show that he honestly believed his
divorce was valid and that he had some basis for that belief. The
trial judge refused to admit this evidence, holding that it was
irrelevant as it related to a mistake of law which could afford no
72. See, for example, Cooper v. Simmons (1862), 7 H & N 707; 158 E.R. 654;
Davis (1928), 20 Crim. App. Rep. 166.
73. See, for example, R. v. Brinkley (1907), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 454; (Ont. C.A.); R.
ex rel. Irwin v. Daley (1957), 118 C.C.C. 116; 25 C.R. 269 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.
Slegg and Slegg ForestProductsLtd. (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 149 (B.C. Prov. Ct.)
74. See, for example, the authorities cited in Note, Reliance on the Advice of
Counsel (1961), 70 YaleL.J. 978 at 991-2.
75. Crichton v. Victorian Dairies Ltd., [1965] V.R. 49, which is discussed in
Brett, supra, note 45 at 181-3.
76. [197313 W.W.R. 150.
77. S.A. 1967, c. 76, s. 35 (1).
78. Id., s. 136(3).
79. R. v. Burkinshaw and Zora, supra, note 76 at 153-4. This case is of little
authority as it was reversed on appeal to the Alberta Supreme Court, Appellate
Division on the basis that the offence was not one requiring mens rea - see R. v.
Burkinshaw and Zora, [1973] 5 W.W.R. 764. The Court made no comment with
respect to Tavender D.C.J.'s statements on the matter of the effect of the
defendants' relying upon legal advice.
80. (1949), 65A. 2d489.
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defence, and so the defendant was convicted. He appealed to the
Supreme Court of Delaware which overturned his conviction and
ordered a new trial. Pearson J., speaking for the Court, stated that a
mistake of law defence could be recognized in this case because
• . . before engaging in the conduct, the defendant made a bona
fide, diligent effort, adopting a course and resorting to sources
and means at least as appropriate as any afforded under our legal
system, to ascertain and abide by the law, and

. . .

good faith reliance upon the result of such effort ....

he acted in
81

The learned judge went on to say:
[in a case
To hold a person punishable as a criminal transgressor
82
such as this] would be palpably unjust and arbitrary.
These cases are, however, exceptional.
Unlike the case of reliance upon judicial decisions there is little
feeling that defendants who act upon the advice of lawyers should
be protected from criminal liability. For example, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code rejected such reliance as constituting a
defence, 8 3 as did the drafters of the proposed Federal Penal
Code.8 4 The principal reason suggested for this view is that, if such
a defence were to be recognized, lawyers could too easily
manipulate it to their own advantage. Hence Hall and Seligman
write:
It would be unwise social policy to reward the clients of lawyers
who gave favorable but unreasonable advice, at the expense of
others in the community who were given unfavourable but
correct opinions on the law. Lawyers are under enough
the
temptations toward dishonesty already, without giving8 them
5
power to grant indulgences, for a fee, in criminal cases.
Apart from the fact that it embodies a somewhat pessimistic view of
the integrity of lawyers, the statement presents a number of
difficulties. It is neither fair nor necessary to use unsuspecting
clients to deal with unscrupulous or potentially unscrupulous
lawyers. It is not fair because it means that a defendant is convicted
not on the basis of his own culpability but on the basis of the actions
of someone else whom he is forced to trust.8 6 It is not necessary
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 497.
Id. at498.
A.L.I., Model Penal Code (1962), ss. 2.03(9) and 2.04(3).
Proposed FederalCriminal Code, ss. 302(5) and 609.
Supra, note 34 at 652.
The criminal law does, of course, utilize the principle of vicarious liability in a
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because there are alternative devices for dealing with incofipetent
or unscrupulous lawyers, for example, the disciplinary processes of
the Barristers' Society. Furthermore, the fear is exaggerated. A
client who is frequently in trouble with governmental officials as a
result of the erroneous advice of his lawyer, whether or not he is
convicted of any offence, should begin to doubt the ability of the
lawyer to handle his affairs and to look to other lawyers for advice.
In most cases, a client who did not take such action could fairly be
regarded as having acted unreasonably or in bad faith. If a defence
of reliance upon the advice of a lawyer were to be recognized it
could be structured so as to deny protection in situations such as this
where there is the likelihood of abuse. The picture of the shifty-eyed
lawyer granting indulgences for a living is surely overdrawn.
Second, Jerome Hall, in keeping with his arguments on mistake of
law generally, argues that to permit such a defence is, in effect, to
permit the individual and his lawyer to act governmentally - to
create law for their own situation, law which is contrary to that
established by the organs of the state; and this, of course, is contrary
to public policy. 87 In his view, a distinction can be drawn between
the actions of judges and governmental officials and those of
lawyers as the former are law-declaring officials whereas the latter
are not. The criticisms of Hall's position which were outlined earlier
are of equal significance in this context. Hall's view, characterized
by Ashworth as "unduly dramatic", 88 is certainly commendable
from a governmental perspective, but from the perspective of the
misled defendant it is equally certainly unsatisfactory. Hall's
distinction between law-declaring officials and lawyers is, it seems
to me, a distinction for lawyers, not for ordinary people. The
layman who seeks assistance with a legal problem may, depending
upon the nature of the problem, seek guidance from one or more of
several sources. In some situations he may be able to go to a
government department, in others he may have no alternative but to
go to a lawyer. He is unlikely, I think, to treat the advice which he
obtains from a government clerk with greater reverence than that
which he obtains from a lawyer. Why, then, should the law
distinguish between the sources of advice? While lawyers are not in
variety of situations but there seems to be little justification for applying it in this
context.
87. Supra, note 25 at 387-8.
88. Supra, note 34 at 661.
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exactly the same position as governmental officials they do, as
Ashworth points out, 8 9 have a public element to their duties - they
are officers of the court and they are, in essence, licensed by the
state to practice law and are given a monopoly in that enterprise. If
the only state-sanctioned source of legal advice in many cases is the
lawyer the state arguably has some responsibility to uphold the
integrity of its processes and protect one who utilizes the
appropriate source. Rather than drawing valid but technical
distinctions between the sources of advice the law should focus
upon the defendant's justifiable reliance upon the advice of the
expert, in this situation his lawyer, thus recognizing that a person's
seeking legal advice "before embarking on a course of conduct is
both reasonable and socially desirable.' '90 In short, the approach of
the Court inLong v. State91 has much to commend it.
If a defence of reliance upon the advice of a lawyer were to be
recognized it should require that the reliance be honest and
reasonable. The requirement of honest reliance follows from the
fact that the defence operates to protect a person from criminal
liability for his actions on the basis that he is not, from a subjective
perspective, blameworthy or culpable. If there is no honest reliance,
there is no strong reason for denying culpability. The requirement of
reasonable reliance can arguably be imposed to prevent abuse of the
defence. 92 In some situations the state interest may demand that the
defence not be recognized, for example, where the advice relied
upon obviously contravenes some fundamental moral principle
protected in the criminal law 93 or where the client has continued to
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Supra, note 80.
92. I have no strong commitment to the position that the reliance must be
reasonable as I am not sure that it is of great practical consequence. If the law
required only that the reliance be honest and the reasonableness of that reliance was
treated as simply an evidentiary factor relevant to the issue of honesty, claims of
reliance in contexts that were clearly unreasonable would generally be disbelieved.
In those situations (probably very few) where a court concluded that an individual's
reliance, although unreasonable, was honest I have no great objection to the court's
affording the individual protection.
93. Thus the defence would not be recognized in a situation where a person
murdered an acquaintance who owed him money as a result of being told by a
lawyer that such a drastic "self-help" remedy was legally permissible. A more
difficult case is where a critically injured person who has suffered "brain death" is
removed from life support systems, and so "dies", by a family member who has
received legal advice to the effect that such action is not illegal. Arguably the
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rely on the advice of a lawyer who has clearly shown that he is not
94
to be trusted.
V. Conclusion

Common law jurisdictions have long drawn a distinction between
errors of law and errors of fact. Canada continues in that tradition.
Honest mistakes of fact, even though unreasonable, afford 95a[
defence; honest mistakes of law, even though reasonable, do not.
This position is to be contrasted with that adopted in jurisdictions
such as Germany which draw no distinction between the subject
matter of the error but rather draw a distinction between errors that
are forgivable and those that are not. 96
The principle that ignorance or mistake of law constitutes no
defence is treated by many as expressing a proposition of
self-evident utility and necessity. So simple and absolute a rle may
have been appropriate at a time when the criminal law was narrow
in scope and therefore fundamental in nature. It is not appropriate in
a modem legal context, however. In recognition of this many courts
and legislatures have reassessed the doctrine, retaining it in respect
to certain offences or situations, modifying in respect to others. My
criticism of the Court in the Dunn case is not that they accept the
basic mistake of law doctrine - s. 19 of the Code compels them to
do that. It is, rather, that the Court shows no sensitivity to the fact
reliance should be recognized here as there is no obvious contravention of a moral
principle.
94. Again, before the reliance is disregarded, the situation ought to be a clear-cut
one.
95. This creates considerable difficulties as to whether particular mistakes should
be classified as "legal" or "factual" and may provide a convenient means for the
courts to escape the rigors of the mistake of law doctrine - see, for example, R. v.
McPhee, supra, note 4 where what seems to be a mistake of law is categorized as a
mistake of fact.
96. German law draws a distinction between "vincible" and "invincible" errors.
The former do not provide a defence as they could have been overcome by ordinary
diligence; they may, nevertheless, lead to mitigation of the penalty. The latter do
afford a defence because they are errors which could not be overcome by diligent
effort. See generally Ryu and Silving, supra, note 14 and Arzt, Ignorance or
Mistake of Law (1976), 24 Am. J. of Comp. L. 646 (part of a symposium on the
new German Penal Code). Interestingly, although German law theoretically gives
much wider scope to mistake of law defences than does the common law, German
practice is not so generous. Arzt, id. at 678, writes:
...full recognition of [the mistake of law] defence in German law has done
more for the good conscience of the legal profession than it has helped
defendants in fact (footnote omitted).
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that doctrine's applicability in some situations requires reconsideration. Furthermore, in order to apply the doctrine to the fact situation
urged in Dunn the Court had to apply a legal theory, long since
abandoned by legal analysts, which has no connection with reality,
does not achieve individual justice and cannot be justified on public
policy grounds.
The Court's view, and indeed the mistake of law doctrine
generally, offers an obvious example of what Edmond Cahn has
identified as the Imperial Perspective. 9 7 This perspective "has been
largely determined by the dominant interests of rulers, governors
and other officials." 9 8 It is reflected in a variety of phrases and
catch-cries which appear repeatedly in judgements 9 and gives
overwhelming emphasis to values such as "governmental efficiency, public order, respect for authority and national
security." 10 0 Extreme emphasis is given to these values at the
expense of the interests of consumers of the law. Cahn argues that
there is, or ought to be, emerging a Consumer Perspective which
gives less emphasis to governmental interests and is concerned to
ensure that the application of legal principles in the context of
particular fact situations does not arouse a sense of injustice. The
mistake of law doctrine in Canada, at least so far as it is applied to
convict defendants who have taken legal advice or relied upon valid
judicial decisions, requires re-appraisal in the light of the Consumer
Perspective.
97. Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective(1963), 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1.
98. Id. at4.
99. Obvious examples are found in the courts' frequent refusals to reach particular
conclusions because of the danger of opening the floodgates or because matters are
classified as "administrative" and the expertise of administrators must be
respected- id. at 6.
100. Id. at 13.

INTENTIONAL
BLANK

